

Professionalism, Piety and the Tyranny of Idleness: Life on Campaign for the English Regiments in Dutch Service, c.1585-1648

According to the Venetian Ambassador in the first half of the seventeenth century, ‘the English nation in war and in other things claims to be superior to all other nations, and is by no means disposed to yield this claim’.¹ This may come as a surprise to many, given the persistent common perception that in 1642, England was a ‘land utterly unprepared for war’ unapt’ and ‘uninclined’ towards military ways, despite the recent work of Barbara Donagan and others that ‘the profession of arms was alive and well in pre-war England’.² Indeed, there is nothing in the Venetian Ambassador’s report to suggest that he thought the English were without a significant level of military expertise, if not a traditional English admiration for themselves and their institutions measured by a contempt and dislike for foreigners.³ England had maintained substantial garrisons in the Netherlands since the 1580s and throughout the Jacobean peace and the ‘halcyon days’ of the Caroline Personal Rule, which had provided a pool of talent for a variety of other English military expeditions throughout Europe and made the nation ‘far better prepared to embark on a war than either contemporary self-congratulation at the emergence of capable soldiers from so pacific an environment or modern revisionism has suggested’.⁴

Much of the explanation for the lack of attention given to this particular episode in English military history can be quite simply put down to the style of warfare these troops were engaged in. As John Cruso observed in 1632, ‘The actions of the modern warres consist chiefly in sieges, assaults, sallies, skirmishes etc., and so affoord but few set battells’.⁵ For the soldiers, this meant that much of their lives were spent, as Doctor Johnson so neatly put it, either ‘in distress and danger, or in idleness and corruption’ but for civilians, such long,

¹ CSPV, 1615-1617, pp. 431-2.

² B. Donagan, *War in England 1642-1649* (Oxford: 2008), p. 33. See also M. C. Fissel, ed., *War and government in Britain, 1598-1650* (Manchester: 1991); M.C. Fissel, *English Warfare, 1511-1642* (London: 2001); P. E. J. Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604* (Basingstoke: 2003); P. E. J. Hammer, *Warfare in Early Modern Europe 1450-1660* (Aldershot: 2007); R. B. Manning, *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (Oxford: 2003); Manning, R. B. *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585-1702* (Oxford: 2006).

³ G. Parrinder, *The Routledge Dictionary of Religious and Spiritual Quotations* (London: 2000), p. 287.

⁴ Donagan, *War in England*, p. 33.

⁵ J. Cruso, *Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie* (Cambridge: 1632), p. 105.

drawn-out encounters hardly make for scintillating reading.⁶ Moreover, in contrast to the numerous fine studies of the Scottish involvement in the European wars of the early seventeenth century, particularly those emanating from the pen of Stephen Murdoch, perhaps a natural Anglo-centricism and a greater self-confidence about their nation's impact on the global stage amongst English historians has prevented much extensive research on the subject of England's involvement in the Continental conflicts of this period.⁷

Therefore, this paper will therefore take the example of the English regiments in the Netherlands to examine the professionalism of England's pre-Civil War military experience. David Trim made an important point when he distinguished between a 'profession' and 'professional'. A 'professional' does not just refer to someone 'who belongs to one of the learned or skilled professions' but also to 'reaching a standard or having the quality expected of a professional person in his work; *competent in the manner of a professional*'.⁸ However, although the career paths of military practitioners followed more informal routes than those of 'the three learned professions' of medicine, law and divinity, military service was historically accepted as being a profession.⁹ Trim identified seven criteria as characteristic of a profession: a discrete occupational identity (that is, a sense of distinction from the rest of society, self-governing), formal hierarchy, permanence, formal pay system, distinctive expertise and means of education therein, efficiency in execution of expertise and a distinctive self conceptualisation (that is, distinctive beliefs and culture).¹⁰ It is the aim of this paper to demonstrate that soldiering in the English regiments in the Netherlands encompassed all of these elements to a greater or lesser degree. This will inevitably involve some kind of modern comparison, as that is 'an obvious point of reference for modern readers'.¹¹

However, as Trim cautioned, one must avoid a sense of a teleological evolution of the military profession and professionalism in general and refrain as far as is possible from making value judgments based on modern perspectives.¹² What is most important is that many who fought in Europe during this time self-consciously regarded themselves as being

⁶ G. Birkbeck Hill, ed., *Boswell's Life of Johnson* (New York: 1891), III, p. 303.

⁷ See, for example, S. Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart* (East Linton: 2000); S. Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648* (Leiden: 2001).

⁸ D. J. B. Trim, 'Introduction', in D. J. B. Trim, ed., *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism* (Leiden: 2003), pp. 1-38, at p. 12.

⁹ Donagan, *War in England*, p. 43; Trim, 'Introduction', p. 6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

members of a profession. The commander-in-chief of the English forces in the Netherlands from 1605-32, Sir Horace Vere, referred to the ‘profession of a soldier’, as did the colonel of one of the English regiments in the Netherlands, Sir Edward Cecil, whilst Vere’s quartermaster, Henry Hexham, talked about the ‘militarie Profession’.¹³ They viewed their profession as one ‘requiring education and training, one with a strong corporate sense of expertise, identity and solidarity, and one with a distinctive ethos’.¹⁴ By stressing this self-conscious aspect of professionalism, not only does one avoid the more inappropriate modern judgments but it allows us to judge how far the English regiments in the Netherlands were professional, in terms of standard, quality and competency, in seventeenth-century terms, rather than our own.¹⁵

In 1585, Elizabeth I signed the Treaty of Nonsuch. This committed her to providing, at her own expense, 5,000 infantrymen and 1,000 cavalrymen towards the army of the seven northern, largely Protestant, provinces of the Netherlands that had separated from the ten southern, largely Catholic provinces and joined together to form the Dutch Republic, which was engaged in a war of independence from the rule of Philip II of Spain.¹⁶ As security for the money loaned by Elizabeth for these troops, she was to have possession of Flushing and Brill - the so-called “Cautionary Towns” - until the war was over and/or the money repaid.¹⁷ By 1588 there were English garrisons in Ostend, Bergen-op-Zoom, Wageningen, Utrecht, Amersfoort and Bergh, as well as in the Cautionary Towns and by the time James I made peace with Spain in 1604, the English troops not in the Cautionary Towns had been organised into four regiments in Dutch pay under the overall command of Sir Horace Vere.¹⁸ Despite the English peace with Spain and a twelve-year truce signed between the United Provinces

¹³ TNA, State Papers, SP 84 - State Papers Foreign, Holland c.1560-1780, vol. 144, fol. 229 (Letter from Sir Horace Vere to Sir John Coke, 13 August 1632); BL, Harleian MS 3638, fol. 155 (Sir Edward Cecil, Lord Wimbledon, ‘The Duty of a Private Soldier’); H. Hexham, *A Tongue-Combat Lately Happening Betwveene tvvo English Souldiers in the Tilt-boat of Grauesend, the one going to serue the King of Spaine, the other to serue the States Generall of the Vnited Provinces* (The Hague: 1623), p. [iii].

¹⁴ Donagan, *War in England*, p. 43.

¹⁵ Trim, ‘Introduction’, p. 12.

¹⁶ Anon., *An Historical Account of the British Regiments Employed since the Reign of Queen Elizabeth and James I in the Formation and Defence of the Dutch Republic* (London: 1794), p. 3.

¹⁷ TNA, State Papers, SP 84 - State Papers Foreign, Holland c.1560-1780, vol. 71, fol. 301 (State of the Cautionary Towns, 1615); E. Grimstone, *A Generall Historie of the Netherlands* (London: 1627), p. 1349.

¹⁸ J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford: 1995), p. 238; D. J. B. Trim, ‘Vere, Horace, Baron Vere of Tilbury (1565–1635)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: 2009), online edn, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28211>, accessed 28 December 2011.

and Spain in 1609, the English soldiers remained in their Dutch garrisons.¹⁹ At the end of April 1616, a cash-strapped James I resolved to part with the Cautionary Towns in return for a payment of £200,000 from the Dutch, a proposal which suited the Dutch, who were concerned that James' increasingly Hispanophile policies would lead him to make the towns available to the king of Spain.²⁰ The towns were officially handed over on 31 May and whilst some soldiers from the garrisons were pensioned off, most joined the English regiments under Vere in Dutch pay.²¹ The English regiments remained in Dutch service until 1648, when the Treaty of Munster officially recognised the independence of the United Provinces from Spain.²²

If we are to count Trim's criterion of permanence as a prerequisite for a profession, the longevity of the Dutch Revolt and the continual support from English troops led to the development of something of a permanent, and thus professional, English army. The English regiments in the Netherlands amounted, to all intents and purposes, a standing army. As Mark Fissel argued, this standing army may not have stood on English soil, their activities may have been conducted by another political power and many may have served at their own expense but the English garrisons in the Netherlands 'were reservoirs of military talent that might be deployed wherever English strategic interests were threatened'.²³ Indeed, the early Stuarts drew troops from this pool of military talent for almost all their military endeavours. For example, troops from the English regiments in the Netherlands were sent to the Palatinate in 1620, Cadiz in 1625 and Denmark in 1626.²⁴

Furthermore, the semi-permanence of the English army in the Netherlands had a direct bearing on another of Trim's criterion for a profession - distinctive expertise and means of education therein. There were no military academies in England until the mid-eighteenth century but many aspiring-soldiers learnt the art of war by serving in the armies of

¹⁹ Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 177; H. L. Zwitzer, 'The Eighty Years War' in M. van der Hoeven, ed., *Exercise of Arms: Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648* (Leiden: 1997), pp. 33-55, at p. 40.

²⁰ *CSPD*, 1611-1618, p. 364; *CSPV*, 1615-1617, p. 226.

²¹ *CSPD*, 1611-1618, pp. 368 and 370; *CSPV*, 1615-1617, p. 197; D. Carleton, *Letters from and to Sir Dudley Carleton, Knt: during his embassy in Holland, from January 1615/16, to December 1620*, ed. P. Yorke (London: 1775), p. 31; C. Dalton, *Life and Time of General Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon* (London: 1885), I, p. 231.

²² Anon., *Historical Account of the British Regiments*, p. 41.

²³ Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 154.

²⁴ TNA, State Papers, SP 84 - State Papers Foreign, Holland c.1560-1780, vol. 95, fol. 275 (Letter from Sir Horace Vere to Sir Dudley Carleton, 21 June 1620); *CSPD*, 1625-1642 Addenda, p. 9; *CSPV*, 1625-1626, p. 548.

Continental Europe.²⁵ The army of the United Provinces, was known as ‘the School of war, whither the most Martiall spirits of Europe resort to lay downe the Apprentiship of their service in Armes’.²⁶ Contemporaries credited Maurice of Nassau, son of William the Silent and Captain-General of the Dutch army, as the one who established ‘an uniforme and Order and Discipline’ and some present-day historians have hailed the Dutch as the first nation to create objective standards for training and commanding soldiers.²⁷ It is incidental here if one subscribes to Michael Roberts’ theory of a “Military Revolution” or not. Roberts formulated the theory that Maurice instigated a Military Revolution in early-seventeenth century Europe by adopting linear formations based on classical models that required more discipline to perform and thus more time and money in training. With these formations, Maurice was able to execute more complicated strategies but required an increased army size, which had a great impact on society in terms of increased economic burdens, administrative challenges and destructiveness. Roberts’ theory has been modified by Geoffrey Parker and come under attack by Christopher Duffy and Jeremy Black, who point out that many of the armies of Europe underwent similar changes at the same time and the development of these changes can be traced back to long before Maurice’s time.²⁸ However, what is important here is that whether or not Maurice was the instigator of any Military Revolution, in order to overcome the might of the Spanish army, he turned to tactics that used more adaptable units and required more time in training and experience in teaching.

A shortage of warhorses in England and the cost of shipping whole cavalry troops overseas meant that very few Englishmen fought in the cavalry units of Continental Europe but by the seventeenth century, the infantry had become the backbone of European armies anyway.²⁹ The development of gunpowder had diminished the role of heavy cavalry and encouraged the evolution of less bulky infantry formations similar to those used by the

²⁵ Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 104.

²⁶ J. Bingham, *The Tactiks of Aelian Or art of embattailing an army after ye Grecian manner* (London: 1616), p. [iv].

²⁷ H. Hexham, *The Principles of the Art Militarie Practiced in the Warres of the United Provinces* (London: 1637), p. [i]; M. D. Feld, ‘Middle-class society and the rise of military professionalism: the Dutch army, 1589–1609’, in P. E. J. Hammer, ed., *Warfare in Early Modern Europe 1450-1660* (Aldershot: 2007), pp. 235-58, at p. 236.

²⁸ For a greater discussion of the Military Revolution and its critics, see G. Parker, ‘The “Military Revolution”, 1560-1660 - a myth?’, in P. E. J. Hammer, ed., *Warfare in Early Modern Europe 1450-1660* (Aldershot: 2007), pp. 1-20.

²⁹ Manning, *Swordsmen*, pp. 7-8.

Romans and thus the Roman stress on training and morale became more relevant.³⁰ Renaissance writers, most famously Niccolò Machiavelli, had argued that the secret to Roman military success was not natural courage but order and discipline.³¹ The pikes and muskets that superseded the use of bows and bills amongst the infantry did not necessitate the same years of training and sustained good health to be militarily effective but the need for drilling as whole units, rather than individual soldiers, increased. Longbows required a great deal of individual skill, acquired through years of practice at the butts but very little teamwork. However, pikes and muskets required careful co-ordination in order to avoid terrible accidents during the firing and reloading of the muskets and to prevent the long pikes becoming more of a hindrance than a help.³² Moreover, the imposition of standardised drill was as much about ensuring coherence amongst the multi-national forces of Continental armies as maximising the impact of muskets and pikes on the battlefield.³³ That said, the English soldiers in Dutch service may not have been exposed to systematic square-bashing. As Trim points out, whilst there was certainly a recognised body of knowledge that was considered necessary for military practitioners to learn, the manner in which this knowledge was imparted not necessarily that formal.³⁴ Indeed only Spain systematically sent recruits to train in the garrison before sending them into the field.³⁵

Even so, the changing nature of weapons and tactics had a profound effect upon the rank structure of the Dutch army and consequently upon career progression. The evolution of the infantry into combinations of pike and shot made a more elaborate rank structure necessary, as the maneuvers the soldiers performed needed more junior officers to control them and these officers had to be men with technical expertise, not just charisma. This meant that there was an increased importance in appointing officers who had actually experience battle, rather than were just well-born.³⁶ The development of a formal hierarchy connected with expertise and efficiency and the creation of objective standards for progression up this

³⁰ J. R. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* (London: 1983), p. 232; H. Hexham, *The Second Part of the Art Militarie Practized in the Warres of the United Provinces* (London: 1638), p. 17.

³¹ F. Gilbert, 'Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War' in P. Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: 1986), pp. 11-31, at p. 25.

³² P. E. J. Hammer, 'Introduction', in P. E. J. Hammer, ed., *Warfare in Early Modern Europe 1450-1660* (Aldershot: 2007), pp. xi-xxxix, at p. xvii; P. E. J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604* (Basingstoke: 2003), pp. 98-99.

³³ Hammer, 'Introduction', p. xxvii.

³⁴ Trim, 'Introduction', p. 13.

³⁵ Hale, *Renaissance War Studies*, p. 230.

³⁶ Parker, 'Military Revolution', p. 8; Feld, 'Middle-class society', p. 245; Hale, *Renaissance War Studies*, p. 226.

hierarchy is clearly evident here. Whilst purchase of higher ranks was not uncommon in Dutch service, such as when Sir Charles Morgan purchased the colonelcy of Sir John Ogle's regiment in 1622, but when it came to recruitment and promotion amongst junior officers, by and large the English colonels in the Netherlands did not prefer 'young men vpon letters and commends' but had 'an eye to old Souldiers of merit, service and experience'.³⁷ In fact, in 1618, fixed promotion criteria were to be introduced in Dutch service.³⁸ Therefore, even those from the highest echelons of society, such as the earl of Essex, were to be found serving amongst the ranks before being given a command in Dutch service.³⁹

That said, those like Essex were often engaged as "gentlemen volunteers". These were men from the highest social strata who volunteered to serve in the ranks. They received no pay but were not expected to pass musters and were not given any specific duties.⁴⁰ Their main role was to stiffen the resolve of the ranks by demonstrating obedience to superior commanders, as well as setting an example in the maintenance of their arms, personal appearance and religious and moral discipline.⁴¹ Gentlemen volunteers usually served within the Colonel's company.⁴² The practice of gentlemen volunteers, who - if the example of men like Essex is anything to go by - did not serve long in the ranks before being commissioned, does rather contravene the principle of a formal hierarchy with objective standards for progression. Yet the increasing value of experience and expertise is still evident and men like Philip Skippon, the future commander of the parliamentary infantry, provide a fine example of those who did make a slow, meritocratic rise through the ranks. Yet it important to point out that not all soldiers in the English regiments in Dutch service chose to make a career out of their military experience like Skippon did. Many gentlemen were 'a soldier swallowlike, for a summer or only a siege'.⁴³ That said, whilst those who sought to make a career of their military life can be differentiated from those amateur gallants who made a limited number of appearances on the battlefield purely to display bravado and gain honour but while on the battlefield or in the garrison, the same values and standards were shared between the two. As

³⁷ Dalton, *Life and Times of General Sir Edward Cecil*, II, p. 15; Hexham, *Tongue-Combat*, p. 104; Manning, *Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. viii.

³⁸ G. E. Rothenberg, 'Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecucoli, and the "Military Revolution" of the Seventeenth Century', in P. Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: 1986), pp. 32-63, at p. 42.

³⁹ R. Codrington, *The Life and Death of the Illustrious Robert, Earl of Essex, &c.* (London: 1646), p. 8.

⁴⁰ Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 129.

⁴¹ Hexham, *Principles of the Art Militarie*, pp. 6-7.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴³ Dalton, *Life and Times of General Sir Edward Cecil*, II, p. 28.

Donagan stressed, even if a gentleman only served abroad briefly, like the future parliamentarian commanders Sir William Waller and Sir Thomas Fairfax, the experience cannot be undervalued.⁴⁴

It was possible for some to make a career out of their life in arms because soldiers in Dutch service could have had reasonable expectations of regular pay, as the United Provinces had in place a formal pay system. Regular pay was essential to any army which depended on foreign troops if that army did not wish their troops to defect to a better paid rival army or turn to spoliation of property for their maintenance. Whilst the Dutch did not offer the highest pay in Europe, they prided themselves on their prompt and regular payment of their forces. The Venetian Ambassador to the United Provinces claimed that ‘nobody’s pay is delivered [late] even for an hour’.⁴⁵ According to William Brereton, the future parliamentarian officer who travelled in the Low Countries in the 1630s, common soldiers in Dutch service could expect to be paid three shillings a week and although the week was calculated at eight days, lodging was free.⁴⁶ There were also benefits in clothing and provisions and an established system for kit exchange.⁴⁷ However, there was no denying that the wages were small. In fact, the wages had remained the same since the 1550s, despite inflation, those offered to a common foot soldier was similar to that which seven year old children could expect to earn in Norwich by knitting stockings.⁴⁸ Many complained that the wages offered were too small to subsist off. For example, the earl of Leicester was forced to recall his son from the Netherlands because the wages given to his son did not meet his son’s expenses and the earl had significantly reduced his own estate by making up the difference.⁴⁹

Moreover, despite the claims of the Venetian Ambassador, there the English soldiers may not have received their pay as regularly as they might have hoped. Governments in early modern Europe could not afford to raise troops from their own resources, so military

⁴⁴ Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 105; B. Donagan, ‘Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England’s Military Education Before 1642’, *Past and Present*, 147 (1995) pp.65-100, at p. 69.

⁴⁵ M. Glozier, ‘Scots in the French and Dutch Armies during the Thirty Years’ War’, in S. Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War, 1618-1648* (Leiden: 2001), pp. 117-41, at p. 131.

⁴⁶ W. Brereton, *Travels in Holland the United Provinces England Scotland and Ireland M.DC.XXXIV-M.DC.XXXV*, ed. E. Hawkis (Manchester: 1844), p. 12. See also Hexham, *Principles of the Art Militarie*, p. 19, where a pikeman’s wage is calculated at 11-18 guilders per ‘long month’, i.e. 40 days.

⁴⁷ *CSPV*, 1615-1617, p. 157.

⁴⁸ J. R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe* (New York: 1985), p. 110.

⁴⁹ *CSPD*, 1619-1623, p. 485.

entrepreneurs advanced money to recruiting officers on behalf of the government.⁵⁰ Estimates suggest that with the number of hands through which funds had to pass in this system, around one fifth to a quarter of the money credited to campaign expenditure never reached its intended destination, due to fraud and corruption.⁵¹ In this aspect, the United Provinces has been compared unfavourably to her European neighbours. Parker demonstrated that although the conditions in terms of payment in the army of Flanders were similar to the Dutch army, the organisational achievements of that army surpassed the capabilities of most other European states.⁵² Furthermore, wagons brought the pay for the entire army and as a result were subject to frequent attacks, causing additional disruptions in supply.⁵³

Yet despite the fact that pay was neither plentiful nor always regularly supplied, those who dedicated themselves to a life in arms had to overcome the stigma of being referred to disparagingly as “mercenaries” and “soldiers of fortune” by contemporaries.⁵⁴ There was a widely-held belief in early modern Europe that, in comparison to native soldiers, ‘strangers are covetous, and consequently corruptible, they are also mutinous, and not seldome time cowardly: their custome likewise is to robbe, burne, and spoile, both friends and foes, and consume the Princes treasure’.⁵⁵ A full-time soldier who served in the Dutch army under contract, was in theory free to choose a new army at the expiration of that contract and during this period many soldiers often moved between armies without compunction.⁵⁶ However, not all regular soldiers merely sold themselves to the highest bidder when it came to choosing an army. The justness of the army’s cause was also important to some. Most English soldiers serving in the Netherlands believed that they were participating in an honourable cause - a Protestant crusade - and so they did not regard themselves as mercenaries. Vere’s quartermaster, Henry Hexham, insisted that the English in Dutch service came so well affected to the Netherlands’ cause and country that the Dutch used them not as mere mercenaries but ‘nobly, freely, and bountifully as Natives’. He accepted that the English soldiers did take pay but it was out of sheer necessity, as who could have afforded not to? Besides, the pay was so meagre that at best, they merely hoped to recoup some of their

⁵⁰ G. Parker, ‘The Universal Soldier’, in G. Parker, ed., *The Thirty Years War* (London: 1984), pp. 191-208, at 195-6.

⁵¹ Hale, *War and Society*, p. 209.

⁵² G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road* (Cambridge: 2004), p. 225.

⁵³ D. Lupton, *A Warre-like Treatise of the Pike* (London: 1642), pp. 58-9.

⁵⁴ Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 21.

⁵⁵ L. Roberts, *VVarrefare Epitomized, In a Century, of Military Observations* (London: 1640), p. 14.

⁵⁶ C. V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War* (London: 1938), p. 87.

expenses.⁵⁷ Of course ‘the modester and better sort’ were mixed together but that was not to deny many fought ‘freely, not with respect to the money, but love of the Cause and Country’.⁵⁸ Clearly, contemporaries did not view true honour and drawing pay as incompatible, as long as a soldier did not become greedy.⁵⁹

Indeed, economic opportunity and stable employment were not the sole motivation in seeking a military career in the Netherlands. Most tended to stress the desire for honour or defence of the gospel in their explanations for enlisting, although few were likely to include economic opportunity amongst their motivations.⁶⁰ It is true that financial considerations must have provided one of the prime motivating factors in deciding to pursue a military career in the Netherlands, as army recruitment was always easier in times of hardship.⁶¹ However, honour and defence of the gospel were in themselves valid reasons to take up arms and one must not underestimate the motivating power of religion and ideology. The justification for Elizabeth’s intervention in the Netherlands was that the king of Spain had violated the laws, privileges and liberties of the Netherlands; the Netherlands were England’s ‘old sure friends’ and their close proximity to England meant that any threat to the Netherlands presented a threat to England; and most importantly, ‘The third motive and the greatest, which outwent matter of State, was the maintenance of the Gospel, and peaceable state of the true reformed Church’.⁶² This last motive was particularly important in order to justify the fact that Elizabeth was aiding rebels (and republican rebels at that) against their anointed monarch.

In fact, the evidence suggests that maintenance of the gospel was a prime motivating factor amongst many of the English who went to fight in the Netherlands. Trim has shown that certainly for the officer corps, when the religious beliefs of the English who fought on the Continent for Protestant princes can be identified, they are almost always zealous Calvinists.⁶³ English Calvinists interpreted the Bible hermeneutically, which meant that they

⁵⁷ Hexham, *Tongue-Combat*, p. 104.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 64 and 104.

⁵⁹ Donagan, *War in England*, p. 228.

⁶⁰ Parker ‘Universal Soldier’, p. 194.

⁶¹ J. A. de Moor, ‘Experience and Experiment: some reflections upon the military developments in 16th and 17th century Western Europe’, in M. van der Hoeven, ed., *Exercise of Arms: Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648* (Leiden: 1997), pp. 17-32, at p. 30.

⁶² Hexham, *Tongue-Combat*, p. 5.

⁶³ D. Trim, ‘Calvinist Internationalism and the English Officer Corps, 1562–1642’, *History Compass*, 4/6 (2006) pp. 1024–48, at pp. 1034-5.

viewed Old Testament people and events as foreshadowing those of not just the New Testament but the post-Biblical era also, which were their anti-types or fulfillments. Christians had always viewed the Church as the spiritual Israel but English Calvinists went further and believed that not only were they the anti-type of Israel but the “chosen” Israel, that is Judah, the kingdom comprised of the two tribes of Israel that remained faithful.⁶⁴ This did not mean that the English viewed other Calvinist nations as corrupt like Israel, as the spiritual Israel could avoid the historical Israel’s unfaithfulness. It was just ‘Englishmen, with their insular vanity, simply thought that England was *especially* dear to God’.⁶⁵ Yet being especially elect did not entail exclusivity, as Judah had responsibilities to Israel.⁶⁶ As other Calvinist nations were the anti-types of the other tribes of Israel, they were therefore family and this led to an obligation for England to aid them with troops or money.⁶⁷

The nature of religious worship in the English regiments in Dutch service followed the reformed practices favoured by Calvinists back in England. The Treaty of Nonsuch had stipulated that ‘The governor and the garrison [of the Cautionary Towns] are permitted the free exercise of religion as in England, and for this purpose, will be provided with a church in each city’. Although this seemingly allowed for Anglican worship, the Cautionary Towns had been under the administration of the earl of Leicester, who favoured religious reform, so worship had generally followed the example of the Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church, the established church in the Netherlands. This set a precedent for worship in the English regiments into the seventeenth century.⁶⁸ Vere’s regiment abandoned the Prayer Book around 1620 and even when the Prayer Book had been used, chaplains often only read selected parts and omitted the ceremonies of kneeling and adoration.⁶⁹ On the basis that the garrisons were provided with their church building by the local government, who also assisted them with the maintenance of their chaplain, local magistrates expected to have some say in the form of worship and choice of chaplain.⁷⁰ The choice of reformed chaplains would have been welcomed by many of the captains and lower officers, who expressed their preference for

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 1028.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 1029.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 1030.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 1035.

⁶⁸ K. L. Sprunger, *Dutch Puritanism: a history of English and Scottish churches of the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (Leiden: 1982), pp. 369-70.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 352.

⁷⁰ C. B. Jewson, ‘The English Church at Rotterdam and its Norfolk Connections’, *Norfolk Archaeology*, 30:4 (1952), pp. 324-37, at p. 324; Sprunger, *Dutch Puritanism*, p. 368.

ministers non-conformable to the Church of England.⁷¹ Like the Dutch magistrates, the officers would have expected some say in the choice of their chaplain, because captains were expected to pay two guilders a week towards the maintenance of the garrison chaplain.⁷² The Netherlands became notorious in England as being a place of refuge for nonconformists. John Quick, in *Icones Sacrae Anglicanae*, wrote that ‘The old Puritan Ministers, who could not of conscience conforme... did shelter themselves from the storms of Episcopall persecution, and from the tyranny of the High Commission Court, in the English Army, and English churches of the Netherlands’.⁷³ However, whilst the Dutch were openly friendly towards non-separating puritans of the Church of England, they were at best aloof, if not outright hostile towards separatists, not least as they needed to maintain the good favour of the English government in order to continue to receive regular supplies of money and troops.⁷⁴

To ascertain if this zealous Calvinism amongst the English officer corps was a cause or consequence of their time in the Netherlands is something of a chicken-and-egg conundrum. In some cases, it is impossible to tell if an involvement in Dutch service may have served to help instigate an attachment to zealous Calvinism or simply confirmed pre-existing beliefs. However, what is clear is that for the Englishmen who fought for the Netherlands in the first half of the seventeenth century, Calvinism was the principal contributing factor towards their formation of what Trim would refer to as a distinctive self conceptualisation. Horace Vere was particularly successful in creating an *esprit de corps* amongst his men that gave them a sense of continuity with those Elizabethan happy few who went to the rescue of their Dutch Calvinist brothers against the might of Spain.⁷⁵ Vere was a renowned supporter of reformed religion and his long service in the Netherlands meant he provided a link back to what were increasingly viewed as the glory days of Elizabeth I.⁷⁶ It also helped that he was the brother of Francis Vere, who, during the Elizabethan period, was ‘more favoured of the low-countries than all other strangers whatsoever’.⁷⁷ The Veres’ reputation meant that many were eager to serve under their command.⁷⁸ The Veres were no

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 262.

⁷³ Brereton, *Travels in Holland*, p. 70; Sprugner, *Dutch Puritanism*, p. 285.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52; A. C. Carter, ‘The Ministry to the English Churches in the Netherlands in the 17th Century’, *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 33 (1960), pp. 166-79, at p. 168.

⁷⁵ C. R. Markham, *The fighting Veres* (London: 1888), p. 456.

⁷⁶ J. Eales, ‘A Road to Revolution: The Continuity of Puritanism, 1559-1642’, in C. Durston and J. Eales, eds, *The Culture of English Puritanism, 1560-1700* (Basingstoke: 1996), pp. 184-209, at p. 200.

⁷⁷ W. Shute, *The Triumphs of Nassau* (London: 1613), p. 124.

⁷⁸ Markham, *fighting Veres*, p. 382.

military geniuses but ‘were simply officers of talent, energy, and perseverance, who with single-minded zeal devoted their lives to the duty they had undertaken’.⁷⁹

Zeal for the cause amongst Vere and the men under his command had a profound impact their efficiency in the execution of their expertise. As Machiavelli argued in his *Discourses*, the strongest incitement to courage and enthusiasm derives from feelings of personal involvement and moral obligation, so soldiers would fight more valiantly when the war was considered a fulfillment of religious duty.⁸⁰ Indeed, the Venetian Ambassador in England encountered at the start of this paper observed that whilst the English disliked hardship and were susceptible to hunger and disease, they had ‘always displayed great valour’ and were ‘certainly not afraid of death’.⁸¹ Death whilst fighting God’s enemies was not a matter to be feared and ‘one of the core values of English martial culture was there was no hero quite as admirable as a dead hero’ and many stories of valour grew up around those who had lost their lives in the Dutch cause, such as Sir Philip Sidney.⁸² At the siege of 's-Hertogenbosch in 1629, Vere’s company of *Schoonhoven* demonstrated their desire to win honour by engaging in a hazardous distraction of the enemy whilst a mine was laid in a tunnel under the wall of the town.⁸³ At Zierikzee in 1631, if the arousing account of the cleric Hugh Peter is to be believed, the common soldiers too were ‘beseeching their captaines with teares that they might bee preferred’, suggesting that concepts of honour were not solely the preserve of the officer or upper social classes.⁸⁴

However, the disregard for death amongst the English did not automatically lead to an increased efficiency in execution of expertise. A commander’s desire to prove his valour, which would demonstrate his commitment to the cause and win him honour, could lead him to favour individual ambition over public interest and result in bad strategic decision-making and the loss of many men’s lives.⁸⁵ As Humphrey Bohn commented, ‘The blood of the

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 460.

⁸⁰ Gilbert, ‘Machiavelli’, p. 26.

⁸¹ CSPV, 1615-1617, p. 137.

⁸² Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 64.

⁸³ H. Hexham, *A Historicall Relation Of the Famous Siege of the Busse, And the suprising of Wesell* (Delft: 1630), pp. 8 and 20. 's-Hertogenbosch is often referred to in the French translation, Bois-le-duc. The Dutch sometimes refer to it as simply, Den Bosch.

⁸⁴ H. Peters, *Digitus Dei. Or, Good newes from Holland* (Rotterdam: 1631), p. [5].

⁸⁵ Manning, *Swordsmen*, pp. 54 and 67; W. Lithgow, *A True and Experimentall Discourse, upon the beginning, proceeding, and Victorious event of this last siege Of Breda* (London: 1637), p. 36.

soldiers makes the glory of the general'.⁸⁶ Yet Fissel made the point that praise of the feats of the English on the Continent was 'too ubiquitous to be discounted lightly'.⁸⁷ The simple fact was the Dutch relied heavily on English soldiers, who, along with the Scottish soldiers, made up nearly half of Maurice's field armies.⁸⁸ It seems unlikely that someone of Maurice's military calibre would rely on men of questionable ability.⁸⁹ In fact, our old friend the Venetian Ambassador to England remarked that 'Count Maurice speaks highly of the English. He says they have been with him in a large number of his most honourable undertakings' and the Dutch artist Jacon de Gheyn admitted that 'it can not be denied but that the Provinces haue received verye acceptable services at theyr handes'.⁹⁰

However, by 1635, the confessional cause of the Dutch revolt had become confused by the conclusion of an alliance in February between the Netherlands and France against their mutual enemy Spain.⁹¹ It became more difficult to view the Dutch cause as a Calvinist crusade when they received men and subsidies from Catholic France, although some may not have viewed their involvement any differently.⁹² It was noted in 1637 that although every regiment had a preacher who delivered a sermon on the Sabbath in the colonel's tent, 'few Auditors frequent, unlesse it bee a poore handful of some well disposed persons', as 'Religion now, in most parts of the whole Universe is turned to policy'.⁹³ The English regiments' preference for reformed worship had become increasingly under threat after the succession of Charles I to the English throne. In 1628 Charles had ordered the English churches in the Netherlands to confine themselves to the doctrine of the English Church.⁹⁴ In 1632, in line with the official emanating from England, Vere was obliged to ask his chaplain, Stephen Goffe, to read the prayers of the Church of England, which caused some upset.⁹⁵ The situation worsened with the appointment of William Laud as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633. Laud did not confine his drive for uniformity to the boundaries of the kingdom.⁹⁶ Preachers to the English Regiments who were not conformable to the Church of England

⁸⁶ R. D. Heinl, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, Maryland: 1966), p. 42.

⁸⁷ Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 167.

⁸⁸ Manning, *Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. vii.

⁸⁹ Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 155.

⁹⁰ CSPV, 1617-1619, p. 396; J. de Gheyn, *The Exercise of Arms: A Seventeenth Century Military Manual* (The Hague: 1608), p. [i].

⁹¹ Wedgwood, *Thirty Years War*, p. 390.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 382-83; R. J. Bonney, 'France's 'war by diversion'', in G. Parker, ed., *The Thirty Years War* (London: 1984), pp. 144-56, at p. 154.

⁹³ Lithgow, *True and Experimentall Discourse*, p. 34.

⁹⁴ Jewson, 'English Church at Rotterdam', p. 326.

⁹⁵ CSPD, 1631-1633, p. 530.

⁹⁶ Jewson, 'English Church at Rotterdam', p. 326.

were deprived of their charges.⁹⁷ In 1630, Charles agreed to receive Spanish silver into the mint and then transport minted money to the Spanish Netherlands in English ships in return for a percentage of the silver. This meant that Spain had found a safe way to transport pay to their troops in the Netherlands, the very people the English regiments were fighting, as English ships were technically neutral and thus free from attack, although the Dutch declared that they would attack them anyway.⁹⁸

It would have been hard to portray England as God's chosen Israel when her King had succumbed to thirty pieces of Spanish silver. Whilst Charles was following his Hispanophile foreign policies, his court favoured Catholics and the Church of England persecuted Calvinists.⁹⁹ The military fiascos of Charles expeditions to Cadiz, the Ile de Rhé and La Rochelle in the 1620s 'did much to delegitimise the practice of arms, and hence English warfare'.¹⁰⁰ The definition of chivalry underwent a change in the art, literature and drama of Charles' court, in which the knight's highest ideal went from being the prosecution of war to the guardian of the Caroline peace.¹⁰¹ To those English martialists in the Netherlands, it appeared as if Charles and his court had turned their backs on the international Calvinist cause. Many chaplains to the English regiments in the Netherlands omitted the customary prayers for the king and the congregations of those who did not, including such a high-profile figure as Charles Morgan, were known to walk out during these prayers.¹⁰²

Yet, if the experience of the 1630s fostered a sense of separateness amongst the English soldiers in Dutch service from the rest of English society, their deployment in garrison duties and the siege warfare of the Dutch offensive from 1629 onwards demonstrated that military practitioners could not be divorced from the rest of society completely. Domestic religious disputes amongst the Dutch and the sheer expense of siege warfare prevented the Dutch army from taking to the field in 1630 and in 1633-4.¹⁰³ In fact,

⁹⁷ C. de Jong, 'John Forbes (c.1568-1634), Scottish Minister and Exile in the Netherlands', *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, 69 (1989), pp. 17-53, at p. 47.

⁹⁸ CSPV, 1629-1632, p. 525; C. V. Wedgwood, 'King Charles I and the Protestant Cause', *Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London*, 19:2 (1954), pp. 19-27, at p. 21.

⁹⁹ J. V. Polišký, *War and society in Europe, 1618 - 1648* (Cambridge: 1978), pp. 166-7.

¹⁰⁰ Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 269.

¹⁰¹ J. Adamson, 'Chivalry and Political Culture in Caroline England', in K. Sharpe and P. Lake, eds, *Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England* (Basingstoke: 1994), pp. 161-97, at p. 170.

¹⁰² T. Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution: English Politics and the Coming of War, 1621-1624* (Cambridge: 1989), p. 318.

¹⁰³ CSPV, 1632-1636, p. 229; Brereton, *Travels in Holland*, p. 70; Dalton, *Life and Time of General Sir Edward Cecil*, II, p. 302; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 517, 519 and 521.

for most of the time, the responsibilities of the English troops in Dutch service were dominated by garrison duty in strategically important towns.¹⁰⁴ Military historians often concentrate on major sieges and battles but these were only the tip of the iceberg of the military lifestyle.¹⁰⁵ Many are, as Doctor Johnson observed, shocked when they hear how often soldiers long for war, a longing which comes not ‘prompted by malevolence nor patriotism; they neither pant for laurels, nor delight in blood; but long to be delivered from the tyranny of idleness, and restored to the dignity of active beings’.¹⁰⁶ The majority of the time, soldiers’ lives were, if anything, mind-numbingly boring.¹⁰⁷ Traditionally, soldiers with nothing to do resorted to drinking, gambling, whoring and marauding the local population. However, as much of the fighting took place in the Netherlands itself, the Dutch government could not afford to alienate the Dutch people from their cause.¹⁰⁸

The necessity for regular drill practice brought about by Maurice’s military reforms in the Netherlands not only promoted battle effectiveness but also kept soldiers from the idleness at the root of their regular vices.¹⁰⁹ Maurice’s reforms were based on the principles of Neostoicism. Neostoicism, as Oestreich explained, aimed:

to increase the power and efficiency of the state by an acceptance of the central role of force and the army. At the same time, Neostoicism also demanded self-discipline and the extension of the duties of the ruler and the moral education of the army, the officials, and indeed the whole people, to a life of work, frugality, dutifulness and obedience. The result was a general enhancement of social discipline in all spheres of life, and this enhancement produced, in its turn, a change in the ethos of the individual and his self-perception.¹¹⁰

Stoicism had been present in Europe for centuries but the new stoicism, which was an attempt to reconcile stoicism and Christianity, was established by Justus Lipsius in his *Constantia*.¹¹¹ Maurice was a student of Lipsius, who presented him with a copy of his *Politicum libri six*, which is to be considered to be the basis of Maurice’s reforms.¹¹² The discipline that was so central to the drill square was taught to be an internal, as well as an external process, in which

¹⁰⁴ Glozier, ‘Scots in the French and Dutch Armies’, p. 128.

¹⁰⁵ Parker, *Army of Flanders*, pp. 9-10.

¹⁰⁶ Birkbeck Hill, *Life of Johnson*, III, p. 303.

¹⁰⁷ C. Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars 1638-51* (London: 1992), p. 150.

¹⁰⁸ Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 268.

¹⁰⁹ G. Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State* (Cambridge: 1982), p. 53.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹¹² Rothenberg, ‘Maurice of Nassau’, p. 35.

moral and psychological concepts, such as duty, honour, courage, self-sacrifice and acceptance of death, played a key role.¹¹³

However, as Machiavelli recognised, training and discipline was not enough to guarantee obedience - this had to be reinforced by the fear of harsh punishment.¹¹⁴ The States-General had issued a series of laws and ordinances in 1590 governing the moral lives of their soldiers, which all those in Dutch service had to swear to.¹¹⁵ These became known in England through their translation into English in 1631 and were similar to edicts used in other nations, such as those used by Gustavus Adolphus' Swedish army.¹¹⁶ It is noticeable that whilst many of the directives concerned purely military offences, such as mutiny, corresponding with the enemy, sleeping on watch and refusing orders, these only came after the majority of the commands regulating civilian interactions, such as murder, rape, adultery, setting fire to houses, thieving, violence and threatening women, which were themselves only secondary to the decrees concerned with the grave offences of blasphemy and deriding God's word or the ministers of the Church.¹¹⁷ Thus, the English regiments in Dutch service subscribed to a discrete occupational identity - Trim's final criterion for a profession - that meant whilst they were self-governing with their laws and ordinances, these combined civilian codes within established military codes.¹¹⁸ The punishments for breaking these ordinances were severe. Punishments included boring through the tongue, whipping and, in many instances, death.¹¹⁹ Machiavelli pointed out that good leaders must not mind enforcing punishment and considered that it was 'better to be feared than loved', although the man-management style of the English officers were not as uniformly harsh.¹²⁰ Horace Vere, who although was a strict disciplinarian, was less stern than his brother and had a reputation for modesty and ruling men by kindness, rather than severity. It was said that soldiers were in awe of Francis but loved Horace.¹²¹

¹¹³ de Moor, 'Experience and Experiment', p. 24; R. McCullough, 'Military Theory: Early Modern 1450-1800', in C. Messenger, ed., *Reader's Guide to Military History* (London: 2001), pp. 369-72, at p. 370.

¹¹⁴ Gilbert, 'Machiavelli', p. 25.

¹¹⁵ United Provinces of the Netherlands Staten Generaal, *Laws and Ordinances touching military discipline* (The Hague: 1631), p. [1].

¹¹⁶ W. Watts, *The Swedish Discipline, Religious, Civile and Military* (London: 1632), p. [iii].

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. [3]-[8].

¹¹⁸ B. Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', *The Historical Journal*, 44:2 (2001), pp. 365-89, at p. 367.

¹¹⁹ United Provinces of the Netherlands Staten Generaal, *Laws and Ordinances*, p. [1].

¹²⁰ Gilbert, 'Machiavelli', p. 25.

¹²¹ Markham, *fighting Veres*, p. 365.

Moral misdemeanours undoubtedly occurred, as after all, the Dutch laws and ordinances were instituted for a reason. Nevertheless, it would seem that the English military hierarchy in the Netherlands did take moral discipline seriously. The laws and ordinances were read out at the head of every regiment at the start of every campaigning season.¹²² Punishments were enforced. For example, two soldiers and a drummer at Maastricht were hanged for robbing peasants who brought in provisions for the army.¹²³ The attempts at enforcing of moral discipline must have been at least reasonably successful, as the Venetian Ambassador noted with surprise that Dutch citizens thought nothing of leaving their wives and daughters alone with troops and some towns even applied to have troops quartered on them because they were so well behaved and because of the economic benefits brought by soldiers ‘who spend twice so much as the States allow them’.¹²⁴ The regular pay system was introduced into the Dutch army to prevent soldiers from turning to extortion.¹²⁵ The situation in the Netherlands must not be confused with that in Germany during the Thirty Years’ War, which stood out to contemporaries for its atrocity, barbarity and lawlessness.¹²⁶ That said, the Dutch wars were bloody and, at times, barbaric. In 1632, the Dutch army was promised that they could pillage Maastricht if they captured it, which caused ‘a pityfull cry of men woemen & children in the Towne’.¹²⁷ Indeed it was generally agreed that plunder and pillage was legitimate in certain circumstances, such as if a town refused to surrender, if it would hinder the enemy’s war effort or if it would sustain an army when supply was difficult.¹²⁸ The fact that the sack of Maastricht was sanctioned by the theorists was of little comfort to those who had to live through it. The Neostoicism that inspired the ordinances that aimed to limit atrocities appealed to witnesses of bloodshed because its emphasis on rationality and restraint of emotion helped men come to terms with the horrors of war.¹²⁹

Nevertheless, whilst one must refrain from painting a rosy picture of seventeenth-century warfare as a game of gallantry and etiquette, the code of honour helped limit the atrocities of war. The importance of honour was not just based on a desire to cling to an

¹²² Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 268; H. Hexham, *A Journall, Of the taking in of Venlo, Roermond, Strale, the memorable Seige of Mastricht, the Towne & Castle of Limburch vnder the able, and wise Conduct of his Excie: the Prince of Orange, Anno 1632* (London: 1633), p. 1.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹²⁴ Oestreich, *Neostoicism*, p. 79; Brereton, *Travels in Holland*, p. 70.

¹²⁵ Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 268.

¹²⁶ Donagan, *War in England*, p. 29.

¹²⁷ Hexham, *Journall, Of the taking in of Venlo, Roermond, Strale*, p. 32.

¹²⁸ Manning, *Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. 206.

¹²⁹ Oestreich, *Neostoicism*, p. 35.

obsolete doctrine but a crucial aspect in the development of military professionalism.¹³⁰ There was an assumption in early modern Europe that one could only win honour in battle when engaged against a worthy enemy, which led to the belief that there was a European brotherhood of arms, sharing the same values.¹³¹ The concept of a European brotherhood of arms was made possible by the fact that both Protestant and Catholic military theory was based on the principles of Neostocism. In Lipsius' writings is found 'more practical psychology than abstract ethics, more direct guidance for wise living than theoretical moralising, more political insight than personal confession' and his 'preoccupation with real life makes his teaching eminently practical' and 'designed to be of service to the whole man'.¹³² Whilst Lipsius' ideas influenced the Calvinist Maurice of Nassau, they were also to be found in Catholic military literature of Raimondo Montecucoli.¹³³ Lipsius himself was influenced by arguments used by the Jesuits. He refused to be drawn into theological disputes and wanted men to be citizens of the world, not just their own countries.¹³⁴

This practical element of Neostoicism was integral to the everyday execution of warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Chivalry had always emphasised the importance of valour, skill in swordsmanship and equitation and above all, that a soldiers 'must be a man of his word and hold his honour very dear - dearer than his life'.¹³⁵ Donagan has shown how traditional chivalric concepts merged into a code of military professionalism, in which the importance of a soldier's reputation for honouring his word was crucial to relations between opponents. It was not merely based on the principle that 'when you have to kill a man it costs nothing to be polite' but down to the fact that honouring one's word was hugely important in a time when infrastructure and sanctions were inadequate to enforce treaties, surrenders, safe conducts and paroles.¹³⁶ This led to the establishment of pre-agreed conventions, which it was assumed would always be honoured, such as the articles between the King of Spain and the United Provinces that agreed fixed rates of ransom for officers and

¹³⁰ Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 36.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹³² Oestreich, *Neostoicism*, p. 31.

¹³³ G. Teitler, *The Genesis of Professional Officer Corps* (London: 1977), p. 190; Rothenberg, 'Maurice of Nassau', p. 56.

¹³⁴ Oestreich, *Neostoicism*, pp. 28 and 33.

¹³⁵ Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 61.

¹³⁶ J. L. Lane and J. Sutcliffe, eds, *The Sayings of Winston Churchill* (London: 1992), p. 39; Donagan, *War in England*, p. 167.

soldiers.¹³⁷ Much of this code was based on a sense of reciprocity - a need to do as one would be done by - rather than high theory.¹³⁸

As Donagan demonstrated, sieges particularly provide a great opportunity to view the code of honour in action.¹³⁹ During the negotiations for the surrender of 's-Hertogenbosch to the Dutch army in 1629, hostages were exchanged as a guarantee of each side's good word to honour the ceasefire and the final articles of surrender reflected the respect the Prince of Orange's forces had for the valour with which the town had defended itself. The garrison was given the honour of marching out with the horse parading with trumpets sounding, cornets displayed and armed with pistols in hands; whilst the foot paraded with drums beating, colours flying, matches lighted and bullets in their mouths. All the sick and wounded were permitted to remain until they had recovered.¹⁴⁰ Separate articles were made with the ecclesiastics, magistracy and burgesses to reflect the civil needs of the town.¹⁴¹ The Prince's insistence on saluting the Governor's wife marked out the defenders of 's-Hertogenbosch as worthy.¹⁴² Thus, as Trim argued, whilst chivalry is often equated with amateurism, rather than military professionalism, a study of the role of honour shows that the two do not need to be mutually exclusive.¹⁴³ The development of military professionalism caused chivalry and the role of the aristocratic power in warfare to change, not decline.¹⁴⁴

In conclusion, this paper has shown that the example of the English regiments in Dutch service has done much to reinforce Donagan's claims that by 1642, a 'thankful sense of England's exceptionalism' at avoiding the direct impact of the contemporary Continental conflicts had 'entailed neither pacifism nor isolation' and thus they did not engage in the tumults of the coming years blindly.¹⁴⁵ Both sides had available to them a core of military

¹³⁷ H. Hexham, *An Appendix of the Lavves, Articles, & Ordinances, established for Marshall Discipline, in the service of the Lords the States Generall of the united Provinces, under the Commaund of his Highnesse the Prince of Orange* (The Hague: 1643), p. 13.

¹³⁸ Donagan, *War in England*, p. 129.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

¹⁴⁰ Hexham, *Historicall Relation Of the Famous Siege of the Busse*, pp. 31-[32].

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. [36]-[41].

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. [42].

¹⁴³ Trim, 'Introduction', pp. 3-4.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ Donagan, 'Halcyon Days', p. 71.

professionals, whose experience of European warfare had prepared them for their own war.¹⁴⁶ It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to assess the impact of this military professionalism on the actual conduct of the Civil War.¹⁴⁷ However, what this paper makes clear is that not only did contemporaries have few doubts that soldiering was a profession but the Dutch army met all seven of Trim's criteria for a profession: a discrete occupational identity, formal hierarchy, permanence, formal pay system, distinctive expertise and means of education therein, efficiency in execution of expertise and a distinctive self conceptualisation. These criteria may have been met with varying degrees of success at times but it is patronising and anachronistic to stress the inadequacies - of course the soldiers were not always as expert as they could have been and there were faults in organisation but there were few who would doubt that these are faults common to all periods.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, service in the English regiments was professional as well as a profession. The 'self-conscious professionalism' of soldiers in England in the seventeenth century has often been underestimated, as Donagan highlighted, 'in part because so many came from and returned to civilian life'.¹⁴⁹ The men who went to fight in the English regiments may not always have fought over a prolonged period of time but whilst in Dutch service, they were required to subscribe to the same values and standards and this experience must not be undervalued.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 67-8 and 98.

¹⁴⁷ This subject has been well covered by Barbara Donagan and forms much of the basis of here work - see: S. Porter and B. Donagan, 'Atrocity, War Crime and Treason in the English Civil War', *American Historical Review*, 99 (1994) pp.1137-66; Donagan, 'Web of Honour'; Donagan, *War in England*.

¹⁴⁸ Hammer, *Swordsmen*, p. 6.

¹⁴⁹ Donagan, 'Web of Honour', p. 368.